Alistair Miller's book, A New Vision of Liberal Education, is a dilation of his doctoral thesis, but it is enormously ambitious in aim: "My specific aim in this book is to explore whether aspects of the two traditions [of Enlightenment and Aristotelian ethics] might be synthesised in the concrete form of a liberal-humanist education" (NVLE, 11) . Indeed, the arc of Miller's argument ranges from these contrasting traditions of moral philosophy, through alternate versions of liberal education, to a proposal for curricular content. The book is well researched and proceeds dialectically, as Miller sifts through scholarship on liberal education, moral education, and curricula, oscillating between exploratory analysis and prescription. With an abundance of arguments, Miller's "new vision" emerges from a series of intellectual hybridizations. The overarching motivation for Miller, however, is to describe an educational vision that is "liberal" and yet embraces the goodness of ordinary experience -"the unexamined life" -and thereby to reject the presump-tion that human flourishing requires a philosophical or intellectual life. Whether his hybrid vision is conceptually stable; whether and how his vision is "new"; whether the exploration succeeds in its ambitions -all issues I will discuss -Miller advances a serious and provocative set of proposals for educational theory and practice. through the careful refinement of a comprehensive position-even though I confess to significant divergences from his proposed solutions. The educational concerns he addresses are philosophically significant and pragmatically pungent, and he writes with the conviction that our aims matter in shaping the worthiness of outcomes.
hybridizations. The overarching motivation for Miller, however, is to describe an educational vision that is "liberal" and yet embraces the goodness of ordinary experience-"the unexamined life"-and thereby to reject the presumption that human flourishing requires a philosophical or intellectual life. Whether his hybrid vision is conceptually stable; whether and how his vision is "new"; whether the exploration succeeds in its ambitions-all issues I will discuss-Miller advances a serious and provocative set of proposals for educational theory and practice.
The problematic context for Miller's work is familiar to all educational philosophers: tension between elitist and democratic values in liberal education; tension between a unified school curriculum of general education and the varying aptitudes and pluralistic life aspirations of pupils; perennial concern to establish an effective connection between pedagogy and character formation; and the question of appropriate roles for the moral and the intellectual in the cultivation of flourishing lives. I commend Miller for addressing these and related issues through the careful refinement of a comprehensive position-even though I confess to significant divergences from his proposed solutions. The educational concerns he addresses are philosophically significant and pragmatically pungent, and he writes with the conviction that our aims matter in shaping the worthiness of outcomes.
My approach will be to follow the arc of Miller's argument, discussing aspects of his views on morality, liberal education, and the secondary school curriculum. I must of necessity be selective. This is a richly argumentative text, and it presents many tempting endorsements and objections for this reader that I must pass by. In the end, I will turn to an assessment of Miller's success in achieving a new vision for liberal education.
The Moral Vision
The first half of Miller's book is devoted to articulating a moral vision that will ground "the justified aims of education." He begins by contrasting two Enlightenment accounts of practical rationality: that of Hume and Kant. He quickly concludes that, concerning morality, "Whereas Hume is all motivation and no reason, Kant might be said to be all reason and no motivation" (NVLE, 14). He argues that Hume assumes our "needs, interests, desires and ends (or goals)…come ready-formed" (NVLE, 12) and offers no ground for determining which dispositions, passions, interests, values, or goals are worth fostering. Kant, on the other hand, In this Aristotelian-cum-MacIntyre approach, focus is on virtues, which are defined in relation to the goal of a practice (a telos). Becoming virtuous requires initiation into a practice, habituation, and a period of apprenticeship. One cannot appreciate the good that is distinctive to a practice from the "outside"; one must have been initiated into the practice. Though practical wisdom is required for the virtues, Miller argues (contra Aristotle) that "phronesis cannot usefully be conceived…as an architectonic intellectual virtue incorporating all forms of practical judgment, because it is impossible to specify the nature of the experience and moral instruction that might produce it in practice….However, it is possible to conceive phronesis in the more restricted sense of 'political judgment'"-that is, "practical judgments about human affairs"
(NVLE, 46). 3 Miller concludes that both the facts of human development and socialization as well as logical necessity make it impossible for any judgment or practical reasoning to be exercised outside of a practice. In other words, we are already and always initiated; there is no life space outside of participation in practices.
Extrapolating from this claim, Miller rejects the ideal of autonomy. He not only dismisses personal autonomy as an educational aim, he also seems to deny its conceptual coherence. Miller says: "I questioned the assumption of many philosophers of education that the overriding aim of education should be to endow people with 'personal autonomy'-autonomy in the sense of possessing the capacity to articulate and justify (i.e., to reflect 'critically' on) one's underlying moral principles and values" (NVLE, 194). 4 Among his reasons are that all values associated with a worthwhile life are located within a socio-cultural tradition and develop through habituation, and that "the reflective engagement in the practices of ordinary life simply does not require (and could not require) 'critical' reflection on the natural of the underlying 'paradigmatic' principles, values and goods of these practices" (ibid.). Miller's several strands of argument seem to overdetermine his case: he claims variously that: (1) engaging in critical reasoning and exercising autonomy are not worthy educational goals because they are not required for a flourishing life; (2) moreover, most pupils do not possess the interest or intellectual aptitude for critical reasoning; (3) elevation of critical reasoning thus privileges a particular philosophical, intellectualist personality; and (4) what is more, the ideal of autonomy is logically impossible anyway and appears to exist only when its proponents self-deceptively claim a perspective independent of a tradition or practice.
Miller hopes to show that "the unexamined life" is worthwhile; that one can live "an Miller believes that the overarching aim of a flourishing life requires: (1) preparing students for engagement in worthy practices and (2) developing their ability to make sound practical judgments about human affairs. The virtues he elevates are traits conducive to wholehearted engagement in practices. He tentatively identifies five groups: (1) "the intellectual virtues," by which he means "dispositions governing our attitude to work (industry, application, perseverance, concentration…)…because they are essential for undertaking the lengthy period of apprenticeship training that is needed if a practice is to be mastered" (NVLE, 93); (2) "the caring virtues," including kindness, compassion, empathy, and generosity; (3) justice; (4) courage and honesty; and (5) temperance. He regards wisdom or phronesis not as virtues, but "rather as goods that arise from the exercise of other virtues and out of the engagement in practices" (ibid.).
Our contemporary curriculum that presents students with a set of disciplines is not adequate, Miller argues, for these educational purposes. Like many incarnations of liberal education, it harbors intellectualist assumptions, caters only to certain academic interests and aptitudes, and fails to prepare students for ordinary life. Moreover, it does not achieve even its averred but misguided aims, Miller claims-though he acknowledges it "has merit for the small minority of pupils with the aptitude and inclination for sustained academic study…those for whom the pursuit of knowledge and truth as an end-in-itself can serve as a motivating ideal"
(NVLE, 139). Viewing the disciplines as practices, Miller persuasively argues that one cannot realize the goods internal to, say, mathematics or history, by relatively brief, introductory experiences. Realizing the goods of a complex practice requires habituation, apprenticeship, and extended time to learn through a range of experiences. Realizing the good of mathematics requires lengthy, specialized study at more advanced levels; and it also requires ability and interest in those who pursue it. Without these, even earnest teaching will provide only "superficial knowledge" and drudgery.
But the deeper problem, says Miller, is that this discipline-centered approach rests on a philosophical, "research" model of liberal education that values cultivation of intellectual powers, critical reasoning regarding values and presuppositions, and the pursuit of theoretical understanding and epistemic autonomy. Miller's preference is an approach based on a rhetorical, neo-Roman, "humanist" model. Its characteristics are: (1) content "drawn from the humanities rather than the sciences-and from the humanities treated in a particular way: not primarily as disciplines worthy of study…or as means of pursuing knowledge and truth for its own sake, or even as means of training the mind, but as repositories of stories and lessons of human experience" (NVLE, 147); (2) reasoning that is practical rather than theoretical, seeking wise decisions rather than explanatory theories; and (3) training of the ability to articulate one's best thoughts and to argue persuasively from one's deepest values.
In this rhetorical spirit, Miller proposes a core curriculum that features grammar and rhetoric and the humanities, aimed not at producing literary sensibility, but "reconceptualising literacy as the art of developing and structuring an argument…and the humanities as funds of stories of human experience-a moral and cultural inheritance" (NVLE, 168-69). He also proposes to feature one subject studied in depth, "a subject that need not be academic in nature but that must have the characteristics of a practice and, so far as possible, be wholeheartedly engaged in. It would thereby serve to inculcate the virtues, primarily intellectual but also moral, that are essential for adult engagement in practices" (NVLE, 195). 6 The subject might be cooking or carpentry or music as well as history or mathematics. "There is…no reason that pupils should not specialize early in the craft, trade, or art form that they envisage one day being their vocation" (so long as the choice is a worthwhile activity)…and "it is unlikely that a pupil's passionate interest in a particular field will have no relevance to some future occupation" (NVLE, 132).
There is much to say about this proposal, but at the practical level, one wonders how many such studies-in-depth any one school can offer? And is this arbitrarily chosen subject intended as an exemplary, sustained apprenticeship with benefits transferable to other practices?
Surely not: according to Miller, if it is to have "wholehearted" engagement, it would require at least a rough match between the selected subject and each student's inclination and ability.
Although I agree that the values of craftsmanship are salutary and regrettably absent from most contemporary liberal education curricula, they may better be located in co-curricular programs and internship opportunities. They are-as Miller acknowledges-currently given space at the undergraduate level in co-curricular programs, internships, outdoor challenge programs, and service learning.
Miller's version of grammar and rhetoric is designed to prepare students both "to lead a virtuous life and to reconcile or choose between conflicting goods" (NVLE if this is to be the comprehensive core curriculum, the aspirations for quantitative, scientific, historical, and political literacy are quietly abandoned.
The New Vision
Miller writes, "My argument in this book is neither radical nor conservative; rather, it is quite simply, that the ordinary life, 'the unexamined life', can also be the good life" (NVLE, 191). I want to question both these assertions. thinking, a general education that features an introductory array of disciplines, and the need for philosophical reflection on the goods and assumptions of practices in which one may engage.
